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Abstract 
Microfinance competition has been transformed over the past two decades by forces such as regulation, 
increased commercialization, technological changes and competition from the formal banking sector. These 
developments have implications on microfinance institutions (MFIs) profitability. This study examined the 
persistence and convergence of MFIs profitability in thirty two Africa economies, between 1997 and 2008, using 
a dynamic panel model. Estimation results shows evidence of persistence of excess profit from one year to the 
next. It is plausible that if there is a shock to profitability level in the current year, about 30% of the effect will 
persist into the following year. This finding is consistent with literature that considers persistence of profitability 
as a signal of barriers to competition reflecting either impediments to market competition or informational 
asymmetry. Government policies that prioritise MFIs financial stability over competition may therefore 
introduce new barriers to competition by insulating incumbent MFIs from rivalry. On average MFI profitability 
is higher for MFIs that are highly capitalized and efficient, but lower for MFIs with increased exposure to credit 
risk 
JEL classification: G21; D41; L11 
Keywords: Microbanking; Profitability; Competition; Persistence; Convergence; Dynamic panel estimation. 
 
1. Introduction  
Microfinance competition has been transformed over the past two decades by forces such as regulation, 
increased commercialization of microfinance, technological changes and competition from the formal financial 
sector (Cull et al 2009c). These developments have implications on MFIs profitability. Theoretical literature has 
established conditions under which intense competition leads to the poorest borrowers dropping out of the 
microfinance market (see e.g. McIntosh and Wydick 2005). Additionally, competition undermines the dynamic 
incentives at the root of microfinance loan contracts (Guttman 2008; Chowdhury 2007). To a large extent, 
competition in microfinance has gone under-studied due to lack of data. Recent improvements in the data 
enabled us to undertake this analysis. 
The primary goal of this study is to test for the persistence of profits by combining a dataset on the 
performance of microfinance providers with industry specific, macroeconomic and location specific factors. This 
will enable us to offer evidence on whether microfinance industry in Africa is competitive by employing 
alternative method in the empirical analysis. Pertinent questions concern whether one observes convergence to 
the mean, moderate/high persistence or explosive paths.   
To achieve this objective, the study used system GMM dynamic model to test the hypothesis that entry 
and exit are sufficiently free to eliminate any supernormal profits quickly, so that MFI profit rates converge 
rapidly towards their long-run equilibrium values. The alternative hypothesis is that the structural characteristics 
of microfinance industry in particular countries, specialist knowledge or regulatory advantages enjoyed by 
incumbent MFIs, renders entry into these regions sufficiently costly. It can be argued that the slower is the speed 
of adjustment, the longer is the period over which supernormal profits may persist, and the greater is the extent 
of the potential departure from the competitive ideal. 
To date, academic research on microfinance competition is limited to; whether the competition with 
conventional banks affects the profitability and outreach of MFIs (Cull, et al 2009b), whether microfinance 
competition worsens outreach and financial self-sufficiency (Hisako 2009), whether microfinance competition 
lowers interest rates (Porteous 2006), whether competition affects the incumbent village bank’s ability to attract 
new clients (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005), whether competition affects the effort and lending decisions of the 
incumbent, deposit growth, loan portfolio composition, repayment rates, and other effort (Park, Brandt, and 
Giles 2003). These studies however do not answer the research question “are microfinance profits persistent?” 
This is perhaps because; (i) their focus is not MFI profitability and (ii) they employ static analytical framework 
which is only relevant when identifying causal relationships between variables when markets are in equilibrium 
(Geroski, 1990). Cross-sectional data usually does not contain sufficient information on which to base reliable 
policy decisions to promote competitive outcomes. Moreover, any abnormal profit realized in one period may 
disappear in the subsequent period which renders intervention by government unnecessary. 
The study therefore seeks to answer two principal research questions (i) Are microfinance profits 
persistent in Africa? (ii) Does the level of persistence converge to the mean, or do we observe explosive paths? 
While the competitive environment hypothesis predicts that profit differentials across firms should disappear in 
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the long run, the empirical evidence tends to give little support to this theory. Answers to these questions are 
important empirically as well as from a policy perspective for the evolving microfinance industry in Africa. To 
date, there has been relatively little discussion, at least within academic circles, and almost no empirical analysis 
of persistence of MFIs profits.  
This study makes four contributions both to literature and policy as follows; (i) to the best of the 
author’s knowledge there is no empirical evidence on whether MFI predicted to earn a high long-run profit 
would in fact earn a high profit rate in subsequent periods. Previous studies examine the convergence of 
profitability to a long-run mean value, either for industries or for the economy as a whole; but the evidence for 
the microfinance industry is clearly lacking. The issue under investigation is highly relevant because if profits 
persistence is only a short-term phenomenon among the MFIs, then its anti-competitive implication would be 
limited.  (ii) Profits are also an important source for equity. If reinvested, this should lead to more stable MFIs 
which could promote financial stability in the microfinance sector.  (iii) At the policy level, the existence of 
profit persistence may imply that shocks to profitability persist indefinitely and that competitive pressures never 
erode differences in profitability.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on persistence 
of firm profits. Section 3 describes the model specification. Data description and measurement is provided in 
section 4. Section 5 discusses econometric methodology. Section 6 presents the empirical findings. The final 
section spells out some concluding remarks and policy suggestions.  
 
2. Previous literature 
Since the seminal work of Mueller (1977, 1986), there is a growing empirical literature focused on the 
persistence of firm profits. Mueller (1977), points that the average firm's profit comprises both permanent and 
short-run components, which converge over time. However, the direction of such effect is unclear; thus so far it 
is not possible to determine profit persistence in the microfinance industry a priori.  
Most of the existing empirical literature on persistence of profit is based on manufacturing data, with 
only a handful of studies investigating persistence of profit in banking. The pioneering contribution by Mueller 
(1977), and subsequent Mueller (1986) used a stochastic approach, modelling profitability as a first order 
autoregressive (AR (1)) process 1 . Glen and Singh (2003) test profitability persistence in seven leading 
developing countries and conclude that both short and long-term persistence of firm profit rates for the 
developing economies are lower than those for advanced economies which he attributes to lower sunk cost to 
enter markets, faster growth rates of firms, weaker role of governmental regulations, and the existence of many 
large business groups. This is however inconsistent with theoretical predictions since it implies there is a higher 
level of competition in emerging markets, but the findings confirm Waring (1996) and Geroski and Jacquemin 
(1988) on a sample of industrial firms in three European countries.  
Consistent with theoretical postulation that innovations play the outmost key role in profit persistence, 
(Cefis, 2003) finds that firms that are persistent innovators and earn above-average profits have a high propensity 
to continue doing both while earning above normal profits which corroborates previous findings by (Mueller 
1990). However, extra profit due to innovations can only be temporary, vanishing when competitors start to 
imitate the products or processes of the innovative leading firm.  
A wave of studies in the banking sector has emerged consistently showing that the sector is not 
perfectly competitive. Using a dynamic panel model, Goddard, et al (2010) investigates the convergence of bank 
profitability in eight European Union member countries, between 1992 and 2007. Their results show evidence of 
persistence of excess profit from one year to the next, which was lower in 1999-2007 than it was in 1992-98 in 
all the eight countries. Their findings are consistent with Flamini et al (2009) who in a cross-country study for 
Sub-Saharan Africa, finds modest persistence.  Athanasoglou, et al. (2008) applies a dynamic panel data model 
to study the performance of Greek banks over the period 1985-2001 and find profit persistence. This result 
confirms those reported in Carbo and Fernandez (2007) who document persistence in bank spreads in Europe. 
Goddard, et al. (2004a) shows persistence of profit to be higher for savings and co-operative banks than 
for commercial banks whose profit levels tend to adjust fairly fast to their average level which corroborates 
Yurtoglu (2004) among Turkish banks. On the contrary Goddard, et al. (2004b) finds in both sets of their 
estimations that there are quite large differences between countries in the magnitudes of the persistence 
coefficients. On a similar vein Berger et al. (2000) conclude that profit converges to its long-run average value 
more slowly in U.S. banking than in manufacturing, and market power plays a significant role in enabling 
                                                 
1 He concluded that there is significant variability in the speed with which profits adjust to their firm-specific permanent 
value across different sectors and countries. Moreover, difference in convergence patterns might be associated with steady 
flow of resources through the persistence of both higher market power and profits above or below average levels over time. 
The potential influence of initial profit rates (See e.g. Mueller, 1990; Goddard and Wilson, 1999) has also been the subject of 
research 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.16, 2016 
 
40 
abnormal profit to persist. On the contrary, Bektas, (2007) uses the panel data method to test for unit roots of 
profitability for 28 surviving banks in Turkey between 1989 and 2003 and their persistence. He concludes that 
persistence of profits does not exist in the long run. One of the central conclusions in the literature is that rivalry 
alone does not therefore erase persistent asymmetries among firms.  
Turning to regulatory policies as a control variable, Cull, et al1 (2011) finds supervision to be negatively 
associated with profitability which confirms previous findings by Hartarska (2005). This is however inconsistent 
with Mersland and Strøm (2009), who using an endogenous equations approach establish that regulation does 
not have a significant impact on financial performance. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) similarly find that 
regulation does no matter on financial performance, after controlling for the endogeneity of regulation. Barth et 
al, (2008; 2004) similarly finds cross-country evidence that regulation has no impact on the performance of 
conventional banks. Clearly this issue remains contestable.  
Table 1 show that the empirical evidence to date focuses on a relatively small number of countries, and 
identifies positive autocorrelation in firm profit rates observed over time. The persistence of firm profit is driven 
by firm-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic context. Moreover, literature lacks formal verification of 
the persistence on microfinance profitability, which might be relevant for the constantly evolving microfinance 
industry. The main objective of this study is therefore to fill this gap in the existing literature. This study 
therefore formulates a dynamic model of the determinants of MFIs profitability, while controlling for other 
factors that are expected to influence profitability. 
Table 1: Summary of profit persistence studies 
Author Country  Sample 
period 
Observation per 
firm 
Speed of 
adjustment 
Muller (1990) US 1950-1972 23 0.183 
Cubbin and Geroski (1987) UK 1948-1977 30 0.482 
Geroski and Jacquemin, 
(1988) 
UK 1947-1977 29 0.488 
France 1965-1982 18 0.412 
Germany 1961-1981 21 0.410 
Waring (1996) US 1970-1989 20 0.540 
Goddard and Wilson, (1999)  UK 1972-1991 20 0.590 
Berger et al (2000) US banks 1969-1997 29 0.900 
Glen and Sign (2003) Emerging countries 1980-1994 10 0.01-0.42 
Cefis (2003) UK-with patent 1978-1991 14 0.187 
UK-no patent 1978-1991 14 0.813 
Goddard, et al. (2004a) EU-Savings banks 1992-1998 7 0.299 
EU-Commercial 
banks 
1992-1998 7 -0.149* 
Goddard, et al. (2004b) EU-Banks  1992-1998 7 0.260 
Yurtoglu (2004) Turkish banks 1985-1998 14 0.430 
Bektas, E (2007). Turkish banks 1989-2003 15 0.030 
Galbreath and Galvin 
(2008). 
Japan  1991-2001 11 0.560 
Athanasoglou, et al. (2008) European 
Banks 
1995-2001 7 0.350 
Flamini et al (2009) Sub-Sahara Africa 1998-2006 Cross country 0.210 
Goddard, et al. (2010) European 
Banks 
1992-2007 Cross country 0.333 
*Insignificant 
 
3. Design of the model  
The persistence of profit approach is based on empirical investigation of the dynamics of firm level profit. Much 
of the existing literature is based on the structure conduct performance paradigm which is based on the static, 
cross-sectional methodology. An alternative to conduct-based measure of competition uses H-statistic and 
                                                 
1 Investigates implications and trade-offs of regulation for the world’s largest MFIs, by examining impact on profitability and 
outreach to small-scale borrowers and women, drawing on a financial data of 245 MFIs from the MIX database that allows 
for within-country variation regarding MFI regulation and supervision. 
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reports evidence of monopolistic competition (Carbo et al. 2009; Goddard and Wilson, 2009). There is no 
certainty that conduct or performance measures observed at any point in time represent equilibrium values. For 
example, an empirical association between high concentration and high profitability that is the standard in 
structure conduct performance models may simply appear by chance, from observations taken during a period 
when the relevant market is in a state of disequilibrium (Goddard and Wilson, 2009). 
Rather than the standard linear regression model and to infer the speed at which abnormal profits above 
or below the normal tend to dissipate, a dynamic model is specified which enables the author to derive the rate of 
adjustment that is most consistent with the observed panel data. Thus, to examine profit persistence, while 
controlling for other covariates in a rather simplified way, the econometric model is specified as follows: 
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More formally, ictP is the profitability of MFI i located in country c, at time t, with i=1, . . .,N, t=1, . . ., 
T; α is the regression constant, 
j
ictC is a vector of MFI-specific characteristics (j) of MFI i in country c during 
the period t;
m
ctC is a vector of macroeconomic country-specific variables (m) in country c during the period t; 
n
ctC  is a vector of institutional development indicators (n) in country c during the period t; 
l
ctC  refers to 
industry-specific factors (l) and icttiict mgue ++= is the disturbance; tg is the unobservable time effects, 
iu is the unobserved complete set of individual MFI-specific effect which controls for all cross-sectional (or 
‘between MFIs’), and ictm is the idiosyncratic error. Augmenting the model with unobservable time effects 
modifies the specification into an unbalanced two-way error component model. D is a binary for the location-
specific dummy variables. dbh ,,  are the coefficients to be estimated.
 
1-P ict  is the one-period lagged profitability and h  is the speed of adjustment to equilibrium which 
gives us some information about the structure of the market. A value of h  between 0 and 1 implies that any 
shock to profits will persist but will nevertheless return to their normal level. In competitive firms, we expect this 
to occur quickly, while in less competitive industries we might anticipate high persistence and a value of h  
closer to 1. If h  lies between 0 and -1, then profits revert to normal in an oscillating manner. This might occur in 
periods of rapid change in the structure of the microfinance sector which can cause MFI profitability to become 
highly volatile. 
 
4. Data and measurement 
4.1 Data description  
The data for this study comprises 210 MFIs across 32 developing economies in Sub-Sahara Africa for the period 
1997-2007 with 2,310 observations. These spans across four different regions that include West (81), East (63), 
Central (23) and South Africa 43. The dataset was assembled from three sources the principal being the MIX 
Market database, World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Heritage Foundation. Persistence of profits is 
evaluated by using the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. 
 
4.2 Control variables 
Given that the MFI data are collected from MIX Market, the MIX Market definitions of key variables are used. 
Capital (CAP) is the ratio of equity capital to total assets1. Gearing ratio (GR) defines the MFI capital structure 
which is measured by the ratio of debt and debt-like instruments to capitalization namely short term debt+long 
term debt divided by total shareholders' equity or simply the debt/equity ratio.  
To capture the relationship between MFI size (S) and profitability, the logarithm of real MFIs’ total 
assets in period t is used for each MFI. Age (Ag) is denoted by the number of years MFI has been in operation 
in order to capture learning effect in MFI performance. The credit risk exposure (CR) is measured by the sum of 
the level of loans past due 30 days or more and still accruing interest namely Portfolio at Risk (PAR>30). 
Efficiency (EFF) in the management of operating expenses: The total MFI costs (net of interest 
payments) can be split into operating and other expenses (such as taxes, depreciation etc). We regard operating 
                                                 
1 While Basel II addresses fewer concepts than the Standards in terms of direct application to MFI financial management, 
internal controls, and management reporting, it does outline three “pillars” that are relevant to microfinance 
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expenses as the only direct outcome of MFI management. We thus measure efficiency in expenses management 
by the ratio of Adjusted operating expense/adjusted average gross loan portfolio and in robustness tests, we use 
cost per borrower (CB).  
We use two proxies for the macroeconomic environment; inflation and real GNI per capita growth. We 
use growth of GNI per capita at current US Dollars (GNI) to control for different levels of economic 
development in each country and year. Arguably, this is the most informative single indicator of progress in 
economic development, while inflation expectation is measured at time t-1 annual % change of the GDP deflator 
at market prices for each country where the MFI is located for each year.  
To control the impact on performance by institutions development, we use Property rights (PR) Index 
which ranges from 10 where private property is rarely protected to 100 where private property is guaranteed. 
Freedom from corruption is a quantitative measure that is derived from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). This measures the level of corruption in 179 countries. It is based on a 10-point scale 
where a score of 10 indicates little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a corrupt government. 
Industry specific factors are characteristics that are unique to the microfinance sector. In order to 
control for the differences in profitability arising from the charter that establishes the MFIs, we use (i) Prof as a 
dummy variable indicating MFIs formal profit status1 (equal to one if the organization is for-profit and zero 
otherwise). Again, the markers are drawn from MIX data set. MFIs with not-for-profit charters tend to have 
objectives and funding arrangements that are different from those of more commercially-oriented MFIs (such as 
banks or credit unions). Not-for-profit MFIs place more emphasis on outreach while at the same time relying 
relatively more on donated funds to subsidize those efforts (Cull, et al, 2009a). (ii) Region is a dummy variable 
for each of the four regions in Sub-Sahara Africa to capture location impacts. The nature and composition of 
microfinance business may be such that certain locations are favoured while others are avoided. (iii) REG is a 
binary variable indicating regulation status equal to one if regulated and zero otherwise2. Table 2 lists the 
variables used to proxy profitability and its determinants (including notation and the predicted effect of the 
determinants as established in the literature). 
                                                 
1 See Robinson (2001) for more discussion on the objectives of  commercial microfinance  
2 To the extent that reserve requirements are not remunerated or remunerated at less-than market rates, MFI regulation may 
impose a burden on these institutions. Moreover, regulation of MFIs may lead to a mission drift if the regulatory 
requirements such as capital adequacy divert resources away from serving the poor to serving better off borrowers in order to 
improve capital adequacy ratios with implications on profitability.  
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Table 2: Summary of variables and measurement 
Variable Notation  Measure Predicted 
effect 
Source of 
data 
Dependent variable 
Profitability ROA  Net profits after taxes/Assets   The MIX 
Control variables 
MFI-specific     
Capital  CAP Equity/Assets Positive  The MIX 
Credit risk   
Portfolio at 
Risk 
PAR-30 Outstanding balance, portfolio overdue>30 Days + 
renegotiated portfolio/Adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Negative  The MIX 
Write off 
Ratio 
WOR Value of loans written-off/Adjusted Average 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
Loan Loss 
Reserve Ratio 
LLR Loan loss reserve/Value of loans outstanding 
Risk Coverage 
Ratio 
RC Adjusted Impairment Loss Allowance/PAR > 30 
Days 
Other factors   
Efficiency  Eff Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted Average 
Gross Loan Portfolio 
Negative  The MIX 
Gearing  GR Debt/equity ratio Negative  The MIX 
 Age Ag Age of the MFI in years  Indeterminate  
Size  S  Log of total assets   Indeterminate 
Loan size LS Adjusted Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI per Capita 
Positive  
Industry-specific 
For-profit 
dummy 
Prof Dummy variable equal to one for profit and zero 
otherwise 
Indeterminate The MIX 
Regulated  REG Dummy variable equal to one for regulated and 
zero otherwise 
Indeterminate  
Region  WA Dummy variable equal to 1 for West Africa and 0 
otherwise 
Indeterminate The MIX 
CA Dummy variable equal to 1 for Central Africa and 
0 otherwise 
SA Dummy variable equal to 1 for South Africa and 0 
otherwise 
EA Dummy variable equal to 1 for East Africa and 0 
otherwise 
Institutional development    
Property rights PR Composite Index ranging from 10 (Private 
property is rarely protected) to 100 (Private 
property is guaranteed by the government) 
Positive  Heritage 
Foundation 
Freedom from 
corruption 
COR Composite Index 10-point scale Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) in which a score of 100 
indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 
indicates a very corrupt government 
Macroeconomic 
environment  
   
Inflation 
expectations 
INF Previous annual % change of the GDP deflator Indeterminate World Bank 
(WDI) 
Per capita 
Income 
GNI GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) Positive  
 
5. Empirical methodology 
We begin this section by first estimating and testing for the time effects. We tested the joint significance of the 
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unobservable time effects by the 0................32:0 === TH ggg at the 95% confidence level. We 
experimented with many year dummies and it turns out that none of the time dummies is significant. 
Table 3: Tests for time and country-specific effects 
Model                                                   LM test                                        P-value 
0........32 === CDDD   
χ2 (30) = 126.20  0.8200 
Tggg .........32 ==   
χ2 (11) = 4.19  0.7990 
0........ 3232 ====== tCDDD ggg   
χ2 (41) = 35.44  0.8910 
Where cD represent country dummies and tg time dummies. 
The fact that the year dummy variables are insignificant suggests that there may be no additional 
aggregate macroeconomic effects influencing MFI returns in Sub-Sahara Africa other that those we have 
explicitly controlled for in the estimation model. Since Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests show that time effect is 
not significant, we proceed with the estimation of the following model; 
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Static panel estimates, as do the OLS models, omit dynamics causing the problem of dynamic panel 
bias and as such do not allow us to study the dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi, 2008). Omitted dynamics means 
that such models are mis-specified, because they omit the entire history of the right-hand-side variables (Greene, 
2008).  
When estimating equation (3.2), several econometric problems may arise. First is endogeneity: more 
profitable MFIs may be able to increase their equity more easily by retaining profits. They could also pay more 
for marketing their products and increase their size, which in turn may affect profitability. However, the 
causality could also run in the opposite direction, as more profitable MFIs may hire more personnel (as per the 
expense preference theorem), reducing their operational efficiency.  
The dynamic structure of the model makes the OLS estimator biased upwards 1 and inconsistent, since 
the lagged level of profitability is correlated with the error term. The within transformation does not solve the 
problem, because of a downward bias (Nickel, 1981) and inconsistency. We tackle these problems by moving 
beyond the methodology currently in use in the empirical literature of bank profitability of mainly fixed or 
random effects2.  
A possible solution on the endogeneity problem is represented by the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) technique. GMM developed by Hansen (1982), and the first-differenced GMM estimators for the AR (1) 
panel data that was later developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provides a convenient framework for obtaining 
asymptotically efficient estimators in this context. With a fixed number of years panel and a substantial number 
of observations, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggests estimating equation (3.2) with GMM in first-differences, by 
first differencing the initial equation, which removes the time invariant iu . This renders the equation estimable 
by instrumental variables as;  
)3.3.(..........).........()()()( 11211 ----- -+-+-+-=- ititiiititititiitit xx mmuuubppapp  
Arellano and Bond estimator has however been criticized when applied to panels with very small T, on 
the premise that under such conditions this estimator is inefficient if the instruments used are weak (Arellano and 
Bover 1995; Blundell and Bover 1998; Phillipsa and Donggyu 2007). Blundell and Bond (1998) for example 
shows that when h  approaches 1, so that the dependent variable follows a path close to a random walk, the 
differenced-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) has poor finite sample properties, and it’s downwards biased, 
especially when T is small. Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the System-GMM which is derived 
from the estimation of a system of two simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged first differences as 
instruments) and the other in first differences (with lagged levels as instruments).  
We thus resort to the system GMM3 since there is a gain in efficiency, and the instrument set is valid. 
                                                 
1  The estimation methods based on the OLS principle are vulnerable to the omitted variable bias if some important 
determinants of MFI profitability are not included among the regressors. 
2 Recent studies in the banking literature that use fixed or random effects include for example Flamini et al (2009); Sufian 
and Habibullah (2009), Kosmidou (2008), Hsiu-Ling et al (2007) 
3 There are two types of GMM estimators that have been frequently used. The first one is the first-difference GMM estimator, 
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The system GMM estimator also controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, it’s more suited to estimate 
MFI profitability equations in the empirical framework, than the first-differenced GMM estimator used by some 
previous authors (see for example Flamini et al, 2009). MFIs profitability outcomes may be highly persistent so 
their lagged levels might be very weak instruments for the first differenced equations. We instrument for all 
regressors except for those which are clearly exogenous.  
We are also confronted with the choice of using one-step or two-step estimation. The one-step estimator 
assumes homoscedastic errors while the two-step estimator uses the first-step errors to construct 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors which imply that the one-step estimators are less efficient than the 
two-step estimators even in the presence of homoscedastic error terms (Arellano and Hahn, 2007). Although 
two-step estimators are asymptotically more efficient, they present standard errors estimates that are severely 
downward biased. However, it is possible to solve this problem using the finite-sample correction to the two-step 
covariance matrix derived by Bond and Windmeijer (2002), which can make two-step robust GMM estimates 
more efficient than one-step robust ones, especially for system GMM (Roodman, 2009).  
The last challenge is the risk of omitted variables. To that end, we follow a general to specific strategy 
by estimating an equation with all possible regressors according to the existing literature. We, then, test through 
a Wald test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables that are not significant individually are equal 
to zero. If not rejected, we re-estimate the model only with the controls which were significant in the general 
regression. Otherwise, we test a less restrictive hypothesis but still trying to reduce the number of non-significant 
regressors to the maximum extent possible. We stop reducing the number of regressors when we can reject that 
the remaining set of coefficients of the control variables is equal to zero. The coefficients obtained in this way 
are even more efficient as the number of regressors is reduced to the minimum.  
Finally, to confirm the validity of the instruments, we perform Hansen's or Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as )(
2 kc where k  denotes the number of over-
identifying restrictions and a test of serial correlation among the residuals. We test whether Arellano-Bond 
orthogonality conditions are fulfilled. If there is no autocorrelation in the levels equation, then the error term in 
the first-difference equation has negative first-order autocorrelation and zero second order autocorrelation 
(Baltagi 2008). If we reject the hypothesis that there is zero second order autocorrelation in the residuals of the 
first-difference equation, then we also reject the hypothesis that the error term in the levels equation is not 
autocorrelated which indicates that the Arellano-Bond orthogonality conditions are not valid no matter the 
number of lags used as instruments. 
One limitation of using GMM estimator is that the differencing removes any time invariant explanatory 
variable along with the panel level effect, which does not allow us to introduce the main policy control variables 
of interest for regulatory status, diversity in regional distribution and for profit status into the main estimation. 
The same effect would arise by estimating a linear model with fixed effects (FE), since this doesn’t control for 
factors which differ across MFIs but are constant through time and which we cannot measure directly known as 
unobserved MFI heterogeneity1. A random effect model seems to be the natural choice. We therefore re-estimate 
model 3.2 in a linear fashion by assuming random effects (RE).  
 
6. Empirical findings 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 and 5 presents summary statistics. When descriptive statistics are broken down by region, we observe 
some interesting regional differences. All the regions report an average negative profitability. Although West 
Africa has the oldest MFIs on average, the region has the highest number of MFIs reporting average loan default 
rate and the most inefficient on the management of operational expenses. This may partly be explained by the 
fact that MFIs in some West Africa economies face interest rate ceilings, such as the West African Monetary 
Union usury law that caps MFI interest rates at 27 percent and bank interest rates at 18 percent (Lafourcade, et al 
                                                                                                                                                        
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which uses first-differenced equations with suitable lagged levels as instruments. 
The second one is the system GMM estimator, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
which augments the former by addition of equations in levels with lagged first-differences as instruments. The system GMM 
estimator uses the levels equation (e.g. equation 4.1) to obtain a system of two equations: one differenced and one in levels. 
By adding the second equation, additional instruments can be obtained. Thus the variables in levels in the second equation are 
instrumented with their own first differences.  
1  In micro-econometrics the unobserved firm heterogeneity means unobserved firm characteristics such as corporate 
governance and firm structure. Time variant explanatory variables, however, may be correlated with this unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Managers may for instance opt to work for unregulated MFIs depending on their preferences for autonomy in 
decision making, desire and ability to implement microfinance innovations and therefore MFI regulation may limit the 
manager’s ability to innovate. The significant heterogeneity of MFIs suggests that corporate governance may be correlated 
with MFI characteristics including regulatory status. 
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2006). Although South Africa region has the highest capital adequacy ratio, it also reports the lowest return on 
assets (at an average of -2.5%) while Central Africa has the most mature MFIs based on age. East Africa has the 
largest MFIs in terms of average assets. It also offers the smallest loan size. Perhaps this explains why the region 
has a higher depth of outreach than other regions. The region dominates in terms of outreach with 52 percent of 
all savers and 45 percent of all borrowers in Sub-Sahara Africa (Lafourcade, et al 2006). With respect to gearing 
ratio, MFIs from Central Africa region use more of debt relative to equity in terms of choice of financing 
compared to other regions. There seems to be no regional patterns with respect to macroeconomic variables in 
the raw data. 
We present a correlation test matrix in Table 6. Although most correlation coefficients among variables 
of interest are low, they are nevertheless significant but not perfectly linear. Most notably, regulation status, 
credit risk measure, efficiency, age, size, gearing ratio are all significantly correlated with profitability measure 
which is perhaps an indication that MFIs with higher ROA are those that are regulated, larger in size, older, 
efficient and with lower loan default rates. Age may reflect survivor bias but it is also positively and significantly 
correlated with size, gearing and regulation, an indication that as MFIs matures, they also become larger, use 
more of debt in their financing options and become regulated over time.  
The significant correlation between ROA and gearing ratio implies that higher debt relative to equity 
mat be driving profitability. Interestingly none of the quality of institutions indices or regional dummy variables 
are significantly correlated with profitability. Both security of property rights and freedom from corruption are 
nevertheless significantly and positively related with Central and South Africa dummies but not collinear. To 
uncover the impact that these summary statistics may have on MFIs profitability requires rigorous econometric 
analysis which we pursue in the next section. 
Table 4: Regional/location summary statistics 
 South Africa Central Africa 
Variable Notation Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev Min Max  
Return on assets  ROA 194 
 
-0.025 0.00 0.103 -0.458 0.226 113 
 
-0.007 0.00 0.082 -0.342 0.195 
Age  AG 223 7.543 7 4.104 3 28 121 
 
9.612 8 8.186 3.00 40 
Capital  CAP 222 
 
0.465 0.51 0.495 -1.366 1.000 121 0.313 0.235 0.244 -0.024 1.000 
Gearing  GR 196 
 
1.231 0.63 1.486 0.000 9.090 91 
 
2.325 2.382 1.595 0.000 5.650 
Efficiency  EFF 163 
 
0.776 0.59 0.643 0.080 4.150 87 
 
0.293 0.235 0.315 0.000 2.580 
Portfolio at Risk PAR 223 
 
0.103 0.04 0.156 0.000 1.050 121 
 
0.081 0.03 0.109 0.000 0.500 
Log Size  S 223 
 
14.488 14.46 1.549 9.720 19.756 121 
 
13.862 13.81 2.156 7.268 18.802 
Loan size  LS 224 1.1085 0.541 1.604 0.000 9.038 89 1.267 0.632 2.403 0.00 16.48 
 
Lagged Inflation rate INF 404 
 
0.045 0.00 0.063 -0.006 0.340 252 
 
0.026 0.000 0.056 -0.139 0.299 
Per capita income GNI 165 
 
0.073 0.06 0.106 -0.188 0.289 92 0.076 0.083 0.079 -0.167 0.242 
 
Table 5: Regional/location summary statistics 
 East Africa West Africa 
Variable  Notation Obs  Mean  Median  Std 
Dev 
Min Max  Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev Min  Max  
Return on 
assets  
ROA 353 
 
-0.015 0.00 0.099 -0.866 0.324 442 
 
-0.0064 0.00 0.0886 -0.409 0.100 
Age  AG 382 9.199 7 6.807 3 33 437
  
9.78 9 5.78 3 31 
Capital  CAP 382
  
0.410 0.37 0.292 -1.140 0.994 431 
 
0.318 0.27 0.303 -0.983 1.000 
Gearing  GR 328 
 
1.603 1.151 1.479 0.000 6.100 353 
 
2.082 1.597 1.921 0.000 11.000 
Efficiency EFF 307 
 
0.434 0.34 0.736 0.000 12.250 379 
 
2.211 0.230 11.149 0.000 121.000 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
PAR 381 
 
0.050 0.022 0.077 0.000 0.790 452 
 
0.719 0.027 0.585 0.000 0.748 
Log Size  S 377 
 
14.793 14.51 1.929 8.412 20.541 421 
 
14.299 14.36 2.433 7.102 19.063 
Loan size  LS 429 1.007 0.523 1.88 0.000 15.05 450 1.025 0.318 1.864 0.00 15.05 
 
Lagged 
Inflation rate 
INF 627 
 
0.032 0.000 0.049 -0.058 0.219 795 
 
0.041 0.000 0.118 -0.139 2.3 
Per capita 
income 
GNI 310 
 
0.077 0.10 0.092 -0.106 0.273 351 
 
0.138 0.096 0.231 -0.125 0.434 
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Table 6: Correlations Matrix 
 ROA AG S CAP GR EFF PAR LS INF GNI PROF WA SA EA CA REG PR COR 
ROA 1.000 
1058 
                 
AG .095** 
1055 
1.000 
1143 
                
S .121** 
1056 
.360** 
1141 
1.000 
1144 
               
CAP -.016 
1058 
-.166** 
1142 
-.112** 
1143 
1.000 
1145 
              
GR .130** 
876 
.163** 
950 
.153** 
952 
-.461** 
952 
1.000 
953 
             
EFF -.312** 
865 
-.065* 
897 
.008 
899 
.062 
899 
-.211** 
754 
1.000 
899 
            
PAR -.075** 
1057 
.060* 
1141 
.005 
1142 
-.081** 
1143 
-.004 
951 
.032 
898 
1.000 
1145 
           
LS .123** 
1055 
.108** 
1139 
.003 
1140 
-.116** 
1141 
.096** 
949 
-.098** 
897 
-.026 
1142 
1.000 
1143 
          
INF .044 
1033 
.075** 
1109 
-.033 
1110 
.067* 
1111 
.005 
923 
.102** 
876 
.114** 
1111 
-.062* 
1109 
1.000 
2066 
         
GNI .042 
865 
.092** 
904 
.045 
904 
-.044 
906 
.078* 
756 
-.054 
858 
.078* 
905 
-.006 
904 
.240** 
897 
1.000 
906 
        
PROF -.061 
1058 
.022 
1143 
.045 
1144 
.045 
1145 
-.147 
953 
.080 
899 
.045 
1145 
-.168 
1143 
.081 
2066 
.013 
906 
1.000 
2310 
       
WA .054 
1058 
.077** 
1143 
-.041 
1144 
-.117** 
1145 
.097** 
953 
-.178** 
899 
-.067* 
1145 
.031 
1143 
-.003 
2066 
.096* 
906 
.123** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
      
SA -.057 
1058 
-.128** 
1143 
-.018 
1144 
.121** 
1145 
-.145** 
953 
.276** 
899 
.166** 
1145 
.044 
1143 
.083** 
2066 
-.064* 
906 
.030 
2310 
-.402** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
     
EA -.019 
1058 
.004 
1143 
.079** 
1144 
.062* 
1145 
-.040 
953 
-.007 
899 
-.102** 
1145 
-.096** 
1143 
-.025 
2066 
-.063 
906 
-.079** 
2310 
-.519** 
2310 
-.332** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
    
CA .018 
1058 
.041 
1143 
-.038 
1144 
-.071* 
1145 
.118** 
953 
-.059 
899 
.052 
1145 
.043 
1143 
-.060** 
2066 
.031 
906 
-.115** 
2310 
-.279** 
2310 
-.175** 
2310 
-.230** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
   
REG .134** 
1051 
.131** 
1135 
.116** 
1136 
-.202** 
1137 
.144** 
945 
-.166** 
892 
-.026 
1137 
.142** 
1135 
-.040 
2056 
.006 
899 
-.219** 
2299 
.109** 
2299 
-.072** 
2299 
-.104** 
2299 
.077** 
2299 
1.000 
2299 
  
PR .202 
58 
.514** 
66 
-.101 
66 
.113 
65 
-491** 
52 
.159 
56 
-.129 
66 
0.038 
66 
.002 
113 
-.168 
54 
-.038 
132 
0.80 
132 
.453** 
132 
-290** 
132 
-301** 
132 
-.179* 
132 
1.000 
132 
 
COR -.148 
58 
.235 
66 
-.031 
66 
-.156 
65 
-438** 
52 
.365** 
56 
.045 
66 
-0.043 
65 
-0.92 
113 
-2.04 
54 
.098 
132 
.119 
132 
.344** 
132 
-.114 
132 
-499** 
132 
-284** 
132 
.562** 
132 
1.000 
132 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Figures beneath are the observations (N) 
Table 7 reports results from the basic specification (3.2). The estimated model fits the panel data 
reasonably well, having fairly stable coefficients, while the Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit since the 
overall test statistic shows rejection of the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero (rejects the null 
hypothesis of joint insignificance of parameters). Although the estimated equation indicates the presence of 
negative first-order autocorrelation, this does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would 
only hold if the second order autocorrelation was present but this is rejected by the test for AR (2) errors 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). The value test for the second order autocorrelation implies that the moment 
conditions of the model are valid.  
 
6.2 Persistence of profit and speed of convergence  
The final column of Table 7 gives the preferred model. In all the regressions, the speed of adjustment coefficient 
h  (the lagged profitability measure) is positive and significant. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
is about 0.3 and significantly greater than zero. The departure from perfect competition is however marginal—
profits tend to adjust fairly fast to their average level. This implies that there is some moderate persistence in 
microfinance profitability in Africa. It is plausible that if there is a shock to profitability level in the current year, 
about 30% of the effect will persist into the following year. Intuitively, microfinance industry in Sub-Sahara 
Africa is not competitive.  
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.16, 2016 
 
48 
Table 7: Two-step system GMM estimation results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable  Notation  Variant of model specifications 
1 2 
Lagged ROA 
1-P t  
0.2499***  
(9.22)      
0.3169***    
(10.63) 
Log size  S 0.0090***    
(3.35)    
0.0060***    
(3.54)    
Log age  AG  -0.0001   
(-0.14) 
-0.0117      
(-0.80)    
Capital  CAP  0.0507**    
(2.22) 
0.0750*** 
(2.79) 
Gearing  GR  0.0716***  
(2.98)  
0.1163***  
(3.60) 
Efficiency EFF -0.1863***  
(-6.17)  
-0.2234***    
(-9.70)    
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0327* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0096** 
(-1.94) 
Loan size  LS 0.0008 
(0.94) 
 
Inflation expectations INF  0.0457    
(1.32) 
Per capita incomes GNI  -0.0067    
(0.70)  
Property rights PR  0.0405 
(1.51) 
Freedom from corruption COR  0.0019***  
(2.77) 
Wald-test     χ2(7) =  169.97  
Prob>chi2=0.96 
χ2(11)= 173.06 
Prob>chi2=0.96 
Sargan-testa    χ2(44) =  28.39 
Prob>chi2=0.97 
χ2(44) =  21.62 Prob>chi2=0.99 
AR(1)b     z = -2.98 
p-value = 0.00 
z =-2.79 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2)c      
 
 z = 1.58 
P-value = 0.85 
z =-1.77 
P-value = 0.97 
Estimations were performed using GMM estimation. T-Statistics are in parentheses and significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
The Wald test is a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero 
(Greene, 2008). A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection.  
a Test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0.  (H0: no autocorrelation). 
c Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0. (H0: no autocorrelation). 
The theoretical proposition tested in the profit persistence literature that entry and exit is sufficiently 
free to eliminate any supernormal profits whatever their cause, and that all firms’ economic profit tends to 
converge to the same long-run average rate (see Berger et al., 2000; Singh 2003; Cuaresma and Gschwandtner, 
2008) is not supported here. The findings signal barriers to competition reflecting either impediments to market 
competition or informational asymmetry (Berger et al., 2000). It may also indicate the existence of market power 
in the industry (Goddard and Wilson, 2009). All these factors may encourage and intensify competition or 
slow/accelerate the convergence process. Because microfinance industry in Sub-Sahara Africa is not competitive, 
the application of dynamic incentives at the root of microfinance loan contracts as postulated by Guttman (2008) 
and Chowdhury (2007) may not be undermined. The role of the state should thus be to foster competition in the 
microfinance industry. Government policies that prioritise MFIs stability over competition may have a tendency 
to introduce new barriers to competition by insulating incumbent MFIs from rivalry.  
Comparable evidence amongst the MFIs is scant. Cull, et al (2009b) for example examines competition 
between conventional banks and MFIs and how this impacts on MFIs profitability and outreach of MFIs. They 
find that the effect of competition on MFI profitability appears weak. Hisako (2009) investigates whether 
microfinance competition worsens outreach and financial self-sufficiency. He finds that competition does not 
worsen financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and therefore does not raise subsidy dependence. Porteous (2006) 
examines whether microfinance competition lowers interest rates. Mcintosh, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) 
examine whether competition affects the incumbent village bank’s ability to attract new clients while Park, 
Brandt, and Giles (2003), investigates whether competition affects the effort and lending decisions of the 
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incumbent. These studies do not answer the research question as to whether microfinance profits are persistent 
ostensibly because; (i) their focus is not on MFI profitability and (ii) their empirical framework does not control 
for endogeneity on performance using a dynamic panel econometrics; they employ static analytical framework 
which is nevertheless useful only in identifying causal relationships between key variables when markets are in 
equilibrium (Geroski, 1990).  
In the conventional banking industry, a similar weak evidence of profit persistence was found for the 
conventional European banks by Goddard, et al (2010; 2004), amongst retail banks in Africa by Flamini et al 
(2009) and for the Greek banks by Athanasoglou, et al. (2008). It is however far from a foredawn conclusion that 
what holds true for retail commercial banks as a whole will also hold true for MFI’s. 
 
6.3 Control variables 
Table 8 shows that efficient MFIs are more profitable. Consistent with much of the previous banking literature 
(see e.g. Goddard et al 2010, Athanasoglou, et al 2008), efficiency appears to be a more important determinant of 
MFI profitability. Similarly size and credit risk are significant in explaining microfinance profitability. We also 
find evidence that gives credence to the hypothesis that firms which use more of debt financing are more 
profitable. The findings imply that MFIs that are more leveraged are also more profitable. MFI age is not 
significantly associated with MFI profitability. 
Table 8: Random-effects GLS regression results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable Notation Model specification 
Intercept 
ita  
 
Log Size  S 0.0100*** 
(2.49) 
Log Age  AG  -0.0056 
(-0.49) 
Capital  CAP  0.0453** 
(2.22) 
Gearing  GR  0.0168* 
(1.76) 
Efficiency EFF  -0.1001*** 
(-12.42) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0107*** 
(-2.88) 
Inflation expectations INF 0.1329** 
(2.35) 
Loan size  LS 0.0035 
(0.92) 
Per capita incomes GNI -0.0005 
(-0.01) 
Property rights PR 0.0002 
(0.37) 
Freedom from corruption COR 0.0002 
(0.29) 
For profit PROF 0.0038 
(0.23) 
Regulated  REG 0.0056 
(0.30)   
West Africa WA 0.0521 
(0.78) 
South Africa SA 0.0732 
(1.07) 
East Africa EA 0.0505 
(0.75)   
Central Africa CA 0.0390 
(0.66) 
R2  0.40 
No of obs.  471 
Wald test 
 
 chi2(16=  247.97 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
test 
 
 chi2(1)= 71.63  
Prob>chi2=0.0000 
H0:Var(u_i)=0 
Hausman specification test 
 
 chi2(11) = 73.06 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Estimations were performed using GLS estimation. T-Statistics are in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively.  
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Freedom from corruption is also significant suggesting a higher implicit cost of doing business. Security 
of property rights is positive but insignificant. Property rights finding is counter-intuitive and should be 
investigated further. Macroeconomic context is similarly insignificant. However, as financial systems develop 
and the on-going financial sector reform process in Africa ends, both the current and future rates of economic 
growth are likely to have an enhanced impact on MFI profitability. 
To gain a deeper insight into the processes affecting MFI profitability while controlling for time 
invariant factors, we ran a random effects (RE) model with complete set of controls, including dummies for 
location, regulation and charter status. We are aware that FE model is inappropriate since it would remove the 
time-invariant variables of interest. It is therefore not surprising that the Hausman (1978) specification test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients between RE and FE are not systematic and the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test similarly confirms the presence of individual effects which provides evidence in 
favour of the FE model. We take cognizance of the fact that while the presence of unobserved panel effects 
correlated with the explanatory variables in the regression may bias the result; we try to overcome this bias by 
including a full set of location dummies. 
On the basis of evidence adduced, we do not find empirical support for the hypothesis that institutions 
formally constituted as NGO’s are less profitable. To be attractive investment opportunities, most MFIs 
reporting to MIXmarket strive to run their operations very efficiently and pay close attention, among other 
variables, to profitability of their operations. This finding is consistent with Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2011) who 
does not find significant difference in profitability between for profit and NGOs. Similarly, Cull, et al (2007) 
finds the for-profit dummy insignificant in all their regressions. It also confirms Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) 
who shows that the variable NGO is not significant in their profitability regression. This however does not 
support the theoretical proposition by Besley and Ghatak (2005) who predict that non-profit status alone can 
positively affect performance as donors would be more willing to support MFIs that are NGOs because the non-
profit status guarantees permanency of the MFI social mission.  
We find no evidence to confirm the hypothesis of a positive link between regulation and MFI 
profitability, contrary to the arguments offered by proponents of regulating MFIs (see for example McGuire and 
Conroy, 2000; Steel and Andah, 2003). This counter intuitive finding confirms Mersland and Strøm (2009), who 
establish that regulation does not have a significant impact on financial performance and Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) who after controlling for the endogeneity of regulation, find that regulation has no impact on 
financial performance. Previous findings consistent with these results include Barth et al, (2004) who find cross-
country evidence that regulation has no impact on the performance of conventional banks but inconsistent with 
Cull, et al (2011) and Hartarska (2005) who find supervision to be negatively associated with profitability. 
Clearly this issue deserves further empirical scrutiny. 
We also find that location or regional factor is also not significant in explaining MFI profitability, 
suggesting that this is mainly driven by local conditions. This is contrary to Cull, et al (2007) who found MFIs 
from Eastern Europe and Central Asia and those from Africa outperformed those from other regions in terms of 
return on assets. As the microfinance industry aims at greater geographic diversification, the results indicate that 
profitability is not sensitive to location or regional distributional factors which reinforce the correlations in Table 
6. 
 
6.4 Location analysis 
Studies of the location of services by commercial banks find that they generally favour economically well-
endowed areas/regions to boost their profit margins. Is this the case with MFIs as well? To probe further on the 
location impacts on MFIs profitability, we split the sample of MFIs into four sub-samples, based on the regional 
distribution and estimate a fixed effect model for each sub-sample. This allowed us to compare the results with 
the summary statistics in Tables 4 and 5.  The results in Table 9 show that economies of scale do not matter with 
respect to MFI profitability in South Africa region. It appears MFIs in this region are more constrained by capital. 
Although loan size is not significant in explaining profitability in other regions, it is crucial in West Africa. 
Operational inefficiency is more of a problem in East Africa than other regions perhaps because of the higher 
outreach as shown in Table 5. 
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Table 9: Estimation Results Using Fixed Effects-within (location effects) 
                                           Variant model specifications with robust standard errors    
Variable Notation WA SA CA EA 
Intercept  -0.1221 
(-2.13) 
0.2550 
(0.75) 
-0.5312 
(-1.90) 
-0.4128 
(-2.10) 
Log Size  S 0.0099 
(2.52) 
0.0145 
(0.60) 
0.0386 
(1.97) 
0.0353 
(2.41) 
Log Age  AG  -0.0004 
(-0.25) 
-0.0065 
(-0.89) 
-0.0036 
(-0.42) 
-0.0123 
(-0.39) 
Capital  CAP  0.0026 
(0.10)   
0.0509 
(2.45) 
0.4182 
(2.70) 
0.1893 
(5.36) 
Gearing  GR  0.0058 
(2.40) 
0.0188 
(1.12) 
0.0032 
(0.21) 
0.0148  
(2.64) 
Efficiency EFF -0.1828 
(-7.43) 
-0.1410 
(-5.43) 
-0.4722 
(-4.81) 
-0.3245 
(-11.32) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0157  
(-0.34) 
-0.0158 
(-0.21) 
-0.1215 
(-1.91) 
-0.1520 
(1.97) 
Loan size LS 0.0095 
(2.50) 
-0.0035 
(-0.69) 
0.0026 
(0.23) 
-0.0046 
(-0.38) 
Inflation 
expectations 
INF -0.0011 
(-0.01)   
0.2949 
(1.47) 
0.0544 
(0.33) 
0.0330 
(0.27) 
Per capita incomes GNI -0.0500 
(-1.00) 
-0.0206 
(-0.28) 
0.1340 
(1.42) 
0.1252 
(1.56) 
R2  0.28 0.44 0.79 0.61 
No of obs.  269 105 40 229 
This Table presents regression with robust standard errors results. Estimations were performed using fixed 
effects estimation. T-Statistics are in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, 
** and *** respectively.  
 
6.5 Robustness checks 
To confirm the main results, a robustness check was performed by running the same set of regressions for a 
smaller data set of 1,260 observations over a reduced period of six years (2002-2007). Using a significantly 
reduced unbalanced sample does not fundamentally alter the results. Table 10 shows that the significance and the 
relative magnitude of influence of all variables of interest are preserved. Therefore, while controlling operating 
expenses remains the most important task for MFIs, credit risk, capital adequacy and scale economies play a 
significant role in determining MFI profitability. 
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Table 10: Random-effects GLS regression results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable Notation Model specification 
Log Size  S 0.0113*** 
(2.84) 
Log Age  AG  -0.0104 
(-0.89) 
Capital  CAP  0.0508*** 
(2.46) 
Gearing  GR  0.0198** 
(2.10) 
Efficiency EFF -0.0951*** 
(-11.87) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0102*** 
(-2.56) 
Loan size  LS 0.0031 
(0.92) 
Inflation expectations INF 0.1668*** 
(2.89) 
For profit PROF 0.0105 
(0.66) 
Regulated  REG -0.0005 
(-0.02) 
West Africa WA 0.0487 
(0.74) 
South Africa SA 0.0717 
(1.08)   
East Africa EA 0.0494 
(0.75) 
Central Africa CA 0.0449 
(0.75) 
R2  0.39 
No of obs.  444 
Wald test 
 
 chi2(14)= 229.25 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test 
 
 chi2(1)=58.64 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
H0:Var(u_i)=0 
Hausman specification test 
 
 chi2(9) = 35.97 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Ho: difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
Estimations were performed using GLS estimation. T-Statistics are in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively.  
 
7. Conclusions, policy implications and further research  
In this study, we specified a dynamic empirical framework to investigate persistence of microfinance profits in 
Africa. All the estimated models are robust across various specifications. This makes the findings more reliable 
and credible. The study identifies a series of new findings and policy implications.  
Although competition is effective in eliminating excess profit, the results suggest that this is not 
happening within microfinance industry in Africa. Therefore successful MFIs with advantages which enable 
them to earn supernormal profits can be expected to take measures to try and maintain those advantages in the 
future. This calls for some serious reconsideration of microfinance policy in Africa. Government regulations 
faced by MFIs are often ambiguous and opaque in most of the Sub-Sahara Africa countries which makes it 
difficult as well as labour intensive to create financial stable MFIs (see Lafourcade, et al 2006). Policymakers 
should therefore strive to remove MFI entry barriers as well as other obstacles to competition and similarly lower 
regulatory costs. Competition may support profitability of MFIs if the benefits of agglomeration effects and a 
stronger regulatory environment outweigh negative spillovers.   
In order to maintain a competitive environment, policy makers will need to concentrate not only on 
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capital adequacy, but also on competition in product markets. That notwithstanding, few issues remain 
unresolved. For example, competition for deposits imposes a cost that has to be borne under increased 
microfinance competition, and its role should be analyzed in a dynamic framework that allows for the 
development of customer relationships. MFIs ability to raise funds may also be correlated with depositors' or 
investors' expectations concerning profitability, so that MFIs that are perceived as being profitable should find it 
easier to raise funds as well as entering new markets.  
Given the important role that the microfinance sector plays in the expansion of the private sector, future 
research on the persistence of MFI profits should focus on country-specific studies that will provide country-
level policy conclusions. The model put forward in this study can easily be expanded to include a persistence 
parameter that account for asymmetric profits and profit persistence dynamics or regime shifts in the 
autoregressive parameter governing the autocorrelation in profit rates. Put differently, future research should 
seek to answer research questions such as; to what extent is the estimated speed of adjustment for MFIs reporting 
negative profits different from that of positive profits and the impact of lending technology and the type of 
contract on profit persistence. Another possible extension could be the examination of differences in the 
determinants of profitability between small and large or high-profits and low-profits MFIs. These are important 
considerations for microfinance development in Africa.  
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